The steering wheel of a Chinese car is not in the hands of foreign investors

Xu Bingjin dares to say that he should dare to act and dare to act. The problems he has identified will not be easily changed. His old superior Zou Jiahua once said: “The thing that Xu Bingjin is looking for is that nine cows will not return.” Some industry departments once reported Xu Bingjin to Zhu Rongji. I did not expect Premier Zhu to say to the complainant that he did not listen to Jiahua or listen to me. He did not listen to who he was. It is this disobedient person who has received the trust of Zhu Rongji.

The majority of U.S. negotiators are lawyers. They say that they are ambiguous. However, they do not understand the specific performance of electromechanical products, their production processes, and the level of development of the industry and the status quo. In these respects, the advantages of Americans have become disadvantageous. When they are in blind spots of knowledge, they are also very embarrassed. And this is precisely my strength.

Some people are now propagandizing China’s achievements in the WTO, saying that it has gone too far and has surpassed the historical achievements of reform and opening up. This is inappropriate. The accession to the WTO is the result of China’s reform and opening up, and China’s accession to the WTO has enabled China’s economy to connect with the world economy.

According to the internationally accepted standards, 60% is the critical level of meeting the market economy standards. If it exceeds 60%, it can be considered as the lowest line of market economy standards, which can be regarded as a market economy country. According to this indicator, the degree of marketization in China at the end of 2001 has reached 69%, which means that the market economy system has been established. To date, more than 80 countries in the world have officially recognized China's market economy status. However, the United States and the European Union are not reluctant. Today, they have suffered a crisis and borrowed money from China. China has raised the issue of "market economy status," and none of them agree.

Xu Bingjin knew that he was not too many people. He did not have Shi Guangsheng's high office position, nor did he have the reputation of Long Yongtu, but he was in the eyes of China’s WTO accession delegation or their negotiating counterparts, especially several US trade representatives. For the former, Xu Bingjin is an expert who is familiar with mechanical and electrical products and the automotive industry. For the latter, he is one of the most difficult and toughest negotiators. VOA used the nine words to evaluate Xu Bingjin’s “tough position and alertness. quibble".

The negotiations on China’s re-entry involve many relevant domestic departments. The relevant departments in China have limited knowledge of the “outside world”. When negotiating issues involving the interests of the department are involved, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade responsible for external negotiations is often caught in the middle. It is difficult to coordinate. Due to inconsistent opinions, it is common for both parties to argue and even argue. At the time, Li Lanqing, vice minister of the State Council in charge of foreign economic and trade work, proposed that the heads of relevant departments of the State Council participate in the delegation to the front line to negotiate, let them directly listen to the foreign demands, and let foreign parties listen to the opinions of the Chinese industry.

In September 1991, Xu Bingjin, who had just been transferred from the State Planning Commission to the State Council's Electrical and Mechanical Examination Office, participated in the National Economic and Trade Work Conference at the Beijing West Hotel. Once the meeting was over, Li Lanqing, Vice Premier of the State Council, in charge of economic and trade work, said to Xu Bingjin: “You must go to the front to participate in negotiations. ". Who can think of it and talk about it for 10 years?

Xu Bingjin has been involved in China's re-entry and WTO negotiations since 1991. He has served as deputy head of the Chinese delegation to the China-US Market Access Negotiations and the main negotiator for China's accession to the WTO. He has been chairing China-US market access, electromechanical products and non-tariff measures. Negotiations on such contents are precisely due to his understanding of the status quo of China's machinery and electronics industry and his unmatched expertise. In the course of negotiations, he is confronted with overbearing and nebulous negotiating opponents. In order to safeguard national interests, Xu Bingjin strives to defy the pace. There are degrees of relaxation and the words are sharp. He used familiarity with the advantages of the electromechanical industry, repelled the aggressiveness of the US and the never-ending benefits, safeguarded the country’s major economic interests and national dignity, and finally forced the US to make major concessions, agreeing that China reserved quotas, permits, and imports. Controlling three kinds of import management methods has won precious time for the development of some key industries in China. His strong negotiation style greatly shocked his opponents.

Xu Bingjin has a forthright character. He never evades problems when he encounters problems. He dares to say, dare to act, and dares to behave. The problems he has identified will not be easily changed. His old superior Zou Jiahua once said: “The thing that Xu Bingjin is looking for is that nine cows will not return.” Some industry officials once told Xu Binggui of Xu Bingjin, saying that he did not listen to anyone, and comrade Zou Jiahua was stunned. I did not expect Premier Zhu to say to the complainant that he did not listen to Jiahua or listen to me. He did not listen to who he was. It is this disobedient person who has received the trust of Zhu Rongji. Zhu Rongji once told Xu Bingjin that I like your character and you are not afraid to offend people. In 1991, he was specifically transferred to the “State Council Electromechanical Examination Office” with the greatest power as the principal person in charge. So far, Xu Bingjin is still the person who can come to chat with Zhu Rongji. On the wall of Xu Bingjin's office, he hangs pictures of Premier Zhu and his wife. It was a commemoration of his recent visit to Premier Zhu's house.

Xu Bingjin expressed his wisdom in the interview. He told the truth: The results should be discussed, but problems cannot be avoided. Xu Bingjin said that on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of China's accession to the WTO, to trace back this period of history or post-evaluation of China's accession to the WTO, telling the truth will not only let the whole society understand the ups and downs of the negotiation process, understand the historical truth, and understand the hegemony of the United States and other Western powers. Face-to-face, but also let people understand the understanding of the WTO, not be confused by some appearances. Today, the United States and the European Union, in order to use their own interests, have used some rules of the WTO to suppress our exports. We recognize and understand the WTO, and we must also use the rules of the WTO to safeguard our legitimate rights and interests.

Record the history or the evaluation of things, "big truth" is the most valuable.

Xu Bingjin graduated from Jilin University of Technology in 1964, majoring in automotive management. He successively worked in the State Economic Commission, the State Development Planning Commission, and the State Council's Office of Import and Export of Electromechanical Products, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, and the Ministry of Commerce. He is currently the President of the China European Economic and Technical Cooperation Association and the China World Trade Organization. Senior Advisor.

The application and decision-making process of China’s accession to the WTO “21st Century”: On December 25, 1982, the five ministries and commissions of the State Economic Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the General Administration of Customs submitted to the State Council “to participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”. Please indicate that China is invited to join the GATT. Why did the Chinese government not submit an application until July 1986, during which time did the Party Central Committee consider it?

Xu Bingjin: As far as I know, the application report of the five ministries and commissions was approved by Comrade Chen Muhua, the then deputy prime minister in charge of foreign economic and trade work, on December 31. Other central leading comrades quickly read the report. The State Council approved this report. At the same time, it also clarified the three principled positions and put forward three requirements. But at that time, China had just emerged from the nightmare of the "Cultural Revolution". The domestic political situation was complex and the economy was very bad. It was highly vigilant to the outside world. Therefore, it was very prudent to consider joining a global trade organization. What are the advantages and disadvantages of China's economy and whether it will cause harm or potential harm to the current system in China.

Based on these problems, the central government did not rush to apply for becoming a party to the GATT. Instead, it adopted a gradual strategy. It first attended the General Assembly of the GATT as an observer, then became a special observer and participated in all meetings of the GATT. Finally, the official application was made to become a party. This gradual process also helps the Chinese government to narrow the information asymmetry between international organizations, so as to more reasonably judge whether the conditions of the country at the time are suitable for joining, and analyze the pros and cons that may result from joining.

"21st Century": At that time, the decision-makers judged the advantages and disadvantages.

Xu Bingjin: After the analysis and argumentation of the relevant departments, the conclusions are both favorable and disadvantageous. The favorable aspect is that foreign trade has changed from a bilateral agreement in the past to a multilateral one, which can improve China’s international trade status, help expand the development of opening up and foreign trade, and improve the country’s international status. The disadvantages are: It is impossible to eliminate the discriminatory anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and quantitative restrictions imposed by the West on China, such as retaliation and sanctions. While enjoying rights, they also need to assume the obligations of the GATT. They need to change China's current economic policies to a large extent, and also involve the country’s economic security.

Regarding the fact that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages or harm more than the profits, I think this cannot be measured by numbers. What are the advantages and the disadvantages? These two words cannot be quantified. China’s re-entry into the WTO fully reflects China’s spirit of being a responsible big power and participating in international affairs. China is a world power and has a significant influence on global political and economic affairs. The GATT is an important world economic organization and we do not participate. How to embody the spirit of a responsible great power, therefore, we must first participate in this organization and participate in it later to make a difference. So participating in the negotiations at that time reflected our spirit of participation.

"21st Century": China's re-entry into the WTO negotiations involving the various sectors of the national economy, the Chinese delegation is also composed of many ministries and commissions, so many ministries who work together to cooperate with each other smoothly?

Xu Bingjin: With so many ministries and people gathered together, there is indeed a running-in process. Because the actual situation in the negotiations is very complicated, the solution to many problems needs to be based on the local conditions at the time. In general, during the negotiations, the delegation had overcome various difficulties, faithfully implemented the rules and requirements of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, and completed the tasks relatively well. Of course, there are also some special circumstances. There are also conflicts in work. There are also situations in which individual responsible persons do not listen to everyone’s opinions. However, this is only a case and there is no universality. This thing is mainly reflected in the car.

"21st Century": Can you talk about it in detail?

Xu Bingjin: At that time, the phenomenon of poor spread in the Chinese auto industry was very serious. Compared with the mature automobile industry in foreign countries, the Chinese auto industry can only count as a childish industry. However, Western powers require us to completely liberalize the control of automobiles and let their products enter the Chinese market unimpeded. We are developing countries. The WTO has provisions for naive industries in developing countries, and allowing the market to allow a transitional period. I think that this transitional period should be determined based on our actual situation in China. Therefore, I propose that the transition period for liberalizing the Chinese auto market is 15 years. Negotiations are bargaining. This 15-year plan is actually a plan that relaxes the size, leaving plenty of room to bargain.

However, the Americans quit. They only agreed to a five-year transition period. This is quite a disparity with the 15 years we mentioned and the two sides have started a tug of war. We have been adhering to the 15-year transition period and I will talk about it myself. Although in the end we have loose conditions, this is a negotiating bargain. We can only make concessions and we can make concessions. As we insisted, they could not stand it. Once in Geneva, the U.S. negotiator, Leyle, said to me: If you put it in eight years, we will accept it. This reveals the bottom line of the United States. In terms of negotiation tactics, my approach is to take them slowly. If they can't hold back, they will slowly give you the bottom. If I come up and say that the transition period is 8 years, they will pressure us to accept 5 Year conditions. At the time of my talk, the price of US auto export quotas was 2.5 billion U.S. dollars, and the transition period was five years. Both sides had a great fight for this, but we have not promised the U.S. side.

"21st Century": The subsequent result was that China's auto import quota for the United States was 6 billion U.S. dollars.

Xu Bingjin: China-US market access negotiations are negotiated by various negotiating groups and then centralized by the competent authorities. However, the concentration must be bottom line. In 1999, according to the arrangement of the superior, I did not participate in the final negotiations of China’s accession to the WTO. After the negotiations, I learned that China’s quota for US auto imports is US$6 billion, and that on the basis of US$6 billion, it is increasing by 15% each year. Moreover, the transition period is not eight years, but five years, which is a great disparity with the results of my initial negotiations. The domestic industrial sector has a lot of opinions on this figure. To understand the situation of the comrades in the negotiations, a person in charge of the competent department said that this was Xu Bingjin’s original decision. I was particularly irritated by this statement. I said that 6 billion people are talking about you. At that time, I did not participate in the negotiations. What is my decision? I talked with the Americans, Japanese, and Koreans about the import quota of 1.5 billion U.S. dollars, which is an annual increase of 15%. This figure was calculated from the weighted average of relatively stable three-year data from 1990 to 1997 at 15% per year. At that time, foreigners demanded that I use the maximum import amount for the year that I did not adopt. When I talked to the Americans, the two sides bargained and fought so hard that I did not give up the import quota of $2.5 billion and the eight-year transition period. I didn't expect it to be such a result.

"21st Century": This is not realistic.

Xu Bingjin: I am still very happy about this matter and I am very dissatisfied! Has repeatedly reported to the relevant departments, the Americans proposed a $ 2.5 billion list is still in my hands. The annual import of 6 billion U.S. dollars will increase by 15% each year on this basis. It will be 10 billion U.S. dollars in one or two years, equivalent to 1 million cars. Such a large import volume will increase the pressure on domestic auto companies that are climbing. ? How much impact on the Chinese auto market? The country’s automobile industry policy is clear and a pillar industry was initially established in 2010. Our task is to promote its rapid development, based on the best efforts to give policy protection, or face the pressure of foreign cars, China's auto industry can develop this pillar?

"21st Century": It seems that during the negotiation process, we lost some benefits that could have been obtained. Can I think so?

Xu Bingjin: Can't think so. In the course of negotiations, due to the constraints of many factors, it is often the case that the interests of the two parties are shifting. It is always impossible for the parties to be dominating. However, there must be a general idea and assumption in the negotiation process, that is, how to make good use of the authorization within the scope of the central authority to strive for the maximization of our interests. When negotiating, the bottom line should not be easily thrown. If the negotiation process does not pay attention to tactics, the bottom line will be thrown on the court. Finally, the opponent’s asking price will definitely increase. In the negotiation, the opponent’s asking price is endless, and the opponent is also true or false. If foreigners say that they are true, then they are all over.

Not all Americans understand cars. When their trade representative Carla Shiles and I negotiated, we said that we have vehicle import controls. Then we talk about cars and parts. You have to release the car. She doesn't understand it at all. The car has four major assemblies: the body, the engine, the chassis, and the gearbox. At that time, the Chinese proposed that three of the four major assemblies would be imported at the same time to constitute the characteristics of the vehicle and be considered as an entire vehicle. I asked her then, do you know what is the body? It is not a general concept to let the car body open or not to let go. The car body is combined with the engine and the gearbox to form a single car. Later she realized this thing.

When talking with Li Senzhi, former US trade deputy, about air-conditioning compressors, he also encountered such problems. They asked us to let go of the regulation of air-conditioning compressors. I told him that our principle is to keep small. At that time, China had a large amount of small compressors, which could be produced domestically. Therefore, large compressors have high technological content and domestic production is difficult, so they can be released. I asked the question of 8,000 kcal and 4,000 kcal. He didn't even understand this, and he was stunned on the spot. Since you don't understand, listen to me. I successfully achieved our goal. Later he said to me, I learned a lot from negotiating with you. We have nothing to say. That was the way I talked.

However, during the negotiation process, we cannot highlight our bottom line. We should pay attention to strategy. The strategy is not individualism. It is to listen to everyone’s opinions. It is a combination of democracy and concentration. Listen to everyone’s opinions. Everyone picks up firewood, they are high in flames, and they are not bad. The results of unified cooperation among various ministries and departments.

"21st Century": I heard that you are upright, serious, and sometimes not only to argue with foreigners for some things, but also to quarrel with the Chinese people. During the negotiation, did you quarrel with Long Yongtu?

Xu Bingjin: This is not what you said. Quarreling with foreigners is for the sake of the country's interests. The question of principle cannot be given. Even if they make concessions, they need to make corresponding concessions. This is negotiation. As for the negotiating style, we must have a division of labor. Some sing red faces and some sing white faces. I just sang red face. The same is true of the U.S. negotiators. Some sang a red face and motioned to impose sanctions. Some sang white faces and said that sanctions still required many procedures, not sanction. The first time I took part in the negotiation, I encountered such a thing. The representative of the United States, Messi, was vocal in imposing sanctions on China and the negotiations could not be carried on. The head of the delegation, Zang Zhiguang, told me that you came for the first time, you talk about. I immediately said something that made Messi stunned:

I participated in a day of negotiations. Throughout the day, I heard from the beginning to the end what the Americans want us Chinese people to do. If we do not comply with your request, we must retaliate and sanction China. I feel very horrified and angry at your arrogant words and deeds. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China for more than 50 years, we have been in the US’s blockade, embargoes, sanctions, and revenge. In your sanctions and revenge, our country has become more and more developed and people’s lives have passed. The better. The achievements of China’s reform and opening up have long exceeded the expectations of the world including your United States. Reform and opening up is China’s basic national policy. Regardless of how stormy, the momentum of China’s reform and opening up will not be reversed. It is precisely because of this that during the negotiations on market access between the two sides, the Chinese have demonstrated great Sincerity and forbearance. However, the United States did not make a positive response to China’s sincerity, but instead announced that it wanted to retaliate. To tell you, people who swear to sanction and retaliate against others will end up being sanctioned and retaliated by themselves. You want to put those unrealistic ideas on our heads and force us to accept them. That's impossible. You shouldn't make a mistake. Tell you, we Chinese are not afraid of sanctions and retaliation. You have to impose sanctions on me. I must counter sanctions against you. You must retaliate against me. I must retaliate against you. You punish me with 10 billion U.S. dollars, and I report that I will punish you with 20 billion U.S. dollars. You punished me with 20 billion U.S. dollars, and I reported that you would cut $40 billion in compensation and deal with your sanctions. What we have are methods. If someone wants to do something that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people, we must stay with us. If anyone wants to retaliate against others, he will surely be retaliated against. He will raise his hands on his feet and say that you are such people.

The performance of the Americans is sometimes ridiculous. When you speak with him, he is unreasonable and unreasonable. When you appear in a strong posture, he is another look. Seeing my attitude is so tough, Li Senzhi, another member of the U.S. delegation, hurriedly said: "Mr. Xu, please rest assured that there must be a transitional period for the sanctions and it will take three months before they can be implemented."

Quarrels with Chinese people are different. Sometimes opinions are inconsistent, opinions are divided, and opinions are different. This is not annoying. The same is true for Long Yongtu. We both have our own opinions and we all consider ourselves correct, so we quarrel more. One delegation held a meeting to solicit opinions and let everyone express their opinions. The topic I talked about was the situation of China's machinery industry and electronic industry. I didn’t speak long before I was interrupted by the dragon. He thinks that I represent the interests of the department and the department’s point of view. The delegation is composed of various ministries and commissions of the State Council. How do the people in various ministries and commissions talk about their own ministries and commissions? What is the interests of the department? Is it the department's point of view? I was also on fire at the time. I stood up and asked him, saying who do you represent? Can you alone represent the national interest? Does your opinion represent the country's point of view? Quarrel due to different opinions is a normal situation at work. It is not a personal attack. After that, I spent many years with Long Yongtu. We are still friends.

The 21st Century, the hardship of re-entry and WTO negotiations: I know that the U.S. negotiators always consider themselves as superior and are aggressive in negotiations. Under the pressure of the other party, how did you resolve the other aggressive offensive?

Xu Bingjin: To negotiate with the United States, we must have a clear understanding of this country. Because of its superb political, economic, and military strength, the United States believes that it has global interests and therefore intervenes everywhere in world affairs, with the world’s police and even the world’s sheriff as their own. As the number one capitalist country, the United States is politically incompatible with the communist countries. Any US government is inherently hated by Communist Party-led socialist countries. No matter how superficial state-to-state relations may be, its ultimate goal is to contain, discredit, blockade, and subvert. Therefore, they are always vocal, gesticulating, arrogant, arrogant, very arrogant and often threatened with sanctions. Including the EU, Japan is also the case. I will not eat them. I am the representative of the People’s Republic of China. In the negotiation, I use swords and guns to fight against each other. The friends of the delegation from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation have advised me sincerely not to quarrel with the Americans and advised me to learn more about some US positions. And history. I said that the United States has only a history of more than 200 years and China has more than 5,000 years of history in civilization. Of course, the quarrel can't solve the problem, but we must reason with unreasonable people. It is the scholar who encounters the enemy.

"21st Century": International contacts rely on strength, weak countries have no diplomacy.

Xu Bingjin: However, the market access negotiations between China and the United States are different. As far as national power is concerned, China and the United States are certainly stronger than us. However, market access negotiations between China and the United States are an exchange. The United States has the technology, capital, and high-quality goods. If it compares them with these, it can only be admired. But we have our strengths. China has 1.3 billion people. The Chinese economy is developing rapidly. The developing China needs a lot of technology, capital, and equipment. This means that China is a market with huge potential. You Americans negotiate with us. The purpose is to find a market for their own goods. The two sides complement each other economically and demand each other in markets and commodities. Why should I show weakness before you? Not only me, my colleagues are the same. I tell you a story:

At one time, the U.S. delegation changed its name to Wolfe. Since he participated in the Sino-U.S. negotiations for the first time, Wolff said when introducing himself to the Chinese side that he was the president of the US Motorola India Company and had represented Motorola in various countries to negotiate. In a breath of fresh air and full of showyness, the head of the Chinese delegation who had already lost his breath, Ruan Zhiguang, gave him a blow: “What is worthy of showing off on behalf of Motorola to Japan and India? The small boss of the workshop tells you that the negotiator who is sitting in front of you is the People’s Republic of China. I’m negotiating with you on behalf of China. I’ve also negotiated on behalf of China and other countries in the world. You have put away your small boss. Trick."

"21st Century": How do you think we should use the WTO platform? What should we do next?

Xu Bingjin: The WTO is just a venue for discussion. You can't expect it to bring you any benefits because it is a venue for the settlement of trade disputes. It only gives you a voice, you can express your opinions, and send out the voice of China. Can consult and exchange with relevant countries, this is our biggest gain. After we go in, we must use this platform to fight for the interests of our country's economic development. This is what we should do. But we should not regard it as a venue for us to accept the trial. On the contrary, we must also earnestly use the rules to protect the interests of our country. We must also use rules to beat the developed countries such as the United States and the European Union. This we have already done, but it is still far. Not enough.

The time specified in the special safeguard clause is 12 years. China has entered the WTO for 10 years. With 2 years remaining, we should step up our research and countermeasures. We must strive to resolve the issue of the special safeguard clause when the two-year deadline comes and remove the hat of the “second-class citizen”. . When everything presupposes, it is not expected to be abolished, and preparations are not made early. By then, the United States will delay the development of the European Union by various names or even create reasons to prevent China from entering the WTO completely. The reason is very simple. If there is no restriction on the terms of China, their interests will be affected. This does not meet their national interests. Those who do not meet their interests will oppose it. This is determined by the nature of their country.

Zhai Zhiguang’s remarks to the proud American delegation were greatly shocked. Wolf’s face suddenly rose to pig liver color. He slammed the pen in his hand on the table, facing Zhi Zhiguang: “Mr. Xi, I tell you, I used to be the general representative of Motorola, but I am now a representative of the U.S. government. You must agree to our conditions. If you do not agree with our conditions, we will announce the sanctions this evening at a press conference. ."

Zhai Zhiguang is ungracious: "That depends on what conditions you mentioned. It tells you that the Chinese government will never accept conditions under pressure. Your sanctions will not intimidate people. We have already prepared a list of sanctions. Pressure cannot be solved. Question: "Let opponents make choices under pressure. This is a means for the US to exert pressure on the Chinese side and is also a negotiation skill.

"21st Century": I remember that period of time, you have been negotiating in such an environment, emotional depression.

Xu Bingjin: The trade between China and the United States involved thousands of products with thousands of tax codes. As soon as Americans came up, they arrogantly demanded that we liberalize all non-tariff measures and implement zero tariffs. The gap between the economic strength and the level of industrial technology between China and the United States is huge. Opening a U.S. product may cause a serious blow to an industry in the country, and some may even affect the life and death of a product, a company, or even an industry. Put it? The majority of U.S. negotiators are lawyers. They say that they are ambiguous. However, they do not understand the specific performance of electromechanical products, their production processes, and the level of development of the industry and the status quo. In these respects, the advantages of Americans have become disadvantageous. When they are in blind spots of knowledge, they are also very embarrassed. And this is precisely my strength.

"The steering wheel of Chinese cars is not in the hands of foreign investors."

I studied automobile industry management at university, worked for a long time in the national electromechanical department, and often went to the company for research. From the macro to the microscopic level, from the industry to the products, I was familiar with each product production and market situation. It is handy to talk about. What products are I talking to them all about data, performance, gaps, and the reasons and measures for protecting us from the perspective of China, I understand that they don’t understand, you have to listen to me when you can't tell, and thus, our Disadvantages have become an advantage, and finally forced the United States to agree in the market access agreement that China can retain three import methods of quotas, specific products, and the registration system. Eight-year import transition period is reserved for more than 80 kinds of important mechanical and electrical products such as automobiles, winning valuable development time and market space for domestic related industries.

Let me give you a more typical example. On one occasion, the U.S. representatives claimed to have mastered the list of all non-tariff trade management products of China, and then they did not force me to provide China’s real list, so I would hardly withstand them. I said to them: You said that you have a list of the Chinese side. You first show it to me. Do you not emphasize that China must be transparent? You must also be transparent. When the Americans and I were up for two days, they finally couldn't stand it. We had to hand the bills to me. At first glance, this so-called list was all sorts of messy contents extracted from newspapers and advertisements. It wasn't anything at all. List of Chinese non-tariff measures management. This shows that the United States has not grasped the content of China’s non-tariff measures management products at all, but has resorted to pressure and fraud. I will count on the plan and immediately allow the comrades in the office to re-create a list based on our actual list. The contents of the new list will be re-added to what was already deleted, which is equivalent to making the cake bigger. Americans do not know where they are, and they negotiate with us to define the proportion of products to be released on this big list. This small tactical move protects a large number of Chinese products in urgent need of protection and protects and develops many of China’s infant industries. It is of great significance. Before and after this action for an hour, it is impossible to do anything without actively cooperating with the situation.

"21st Century": China and the United States in the market access negotiations, the United States finally agreed with China's mechanical and electrical product import registration system, this is a victory for China, what is inside this mystery?

Xu Bingjin: This is a confrontation. During the negotiations, the head of the U.S. delegation, Wolff, raised a string of accusations against China and demanded that China eliminate all non-tariff measures, including import licenses and import quotas, and include mechanical and electrical products, including automobiles, in the entire industry. open. Wolfe did not expect that we have made adjustments in our negotiation strategy this time, and all import licenses in non-tariff measures will be converted into import quotas. If the United States does not agree, the original commitment to cancel all import licenses after three years will have to be a blow.

We did not let the U.S. side be caught off guard by this hand, and there was a fierce debate between the two parties. Wolff said that in doing so, we violated the principle of GATT's concessions on non-tariff measures and should withdraw it. I stopped him back on the spot: “I can't do it. China is a developing country. Many industries, including automobiles, belong to the infant industry. The GATT stipulates that there is a certain period of protection for the infant industries in developing countries. The use of appropriate protection for certain industries is in line with the provisions of the GATT."

Wolfe said that you are a disguised protectionism. I explained to him that the purpose of registration is for statistics. China needs to have information on all imported goods. Does Wolf not believe that it is OK to have information on customs? I answered him. Customs information is an afterthought. Our registration is an ex-ante statistic. Finally, we also need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of pre-event statistics and post-event statistics.

Wolfe still did not believe, and he asked, is there any condition for your prior registration? I told him, no.

He still did not believe, and he broke the casserole in the end: "Mr. Xu, please give us an example and tell us what to do with the registration process. For example, if I want to import a car, which department do I go to? Who to find? What do I need to do? Registration form How do you fill it in and who approves it?"

I said: "All provinces and cities in China have import management departments. If there are import requirements, go to the import management department and explain their own import requirements. After receiving a registration form and filling in the registration form, all provinces and cities will Registered information is reported in a unified way, and we have mastered this information according to the country’s foreign exchange reserves and the ability of the enterprises themselves to grasp the quantity of imports in a macro way. Which country does not grasp these situations? These same conditions are needed in the United States, but only statistically. There are different ways."

Wolf never gave up and asked: "You still have a "specific product management approach". Please explain what this "specific product management approach" means?" I told him: "The so-called "specific product management measures" means After the cancellation of quotas, some important products that need to be imported will be solved by tendering. Bidding is a procurement method."

Wolfe said unreasonably: “The bidding laws of your country are illegal.” This immediately provoked me, and I shouted to him: “Our current bidding law is based on China’s national conditions. At present, trials are being conducted. There is a prescribed procedure for bidding in any country in the world. What qualifications do you have to make irresponsible remarks on the Chinese laws?

Later we took the registration system, the registration method and the registration implementation details to Geneva. The Americans did not say anything. Later, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation also began to cooperate with the registration system. The Customs also engaged in the registration system. Registration is our last barrier.

Judging from today’s results, U.S. Europe has used WTO rules to deal with China’s unfair trade. It has been giving impunity to China, sanctioning you today, and restricting you tomorrow. We are bound by the rules of the WTO. We must know that the WTO is only an international trade organization. Americans never take WTO rules seriously. The U.S. representatives openly stated that if WTO rules affect U.S. interests, the U.S. will immediately withdraw from the WTO. The WTO has more than 130 member states. Each country has uneven economic development. Each has its own characteristics and each has its own characteristics. They all use a single rule and can they do it? Must combine the actual application rules of the country. We must not regard the so-called rules of the WTO as a shackle that binds our own hands and feet. We must respect the practice of the WTO, but at the same time we must use the rules of the WTO to protect and develop our own industries in accordance with the reality of our country. From the current reality, we are particularly lacking in this regard and we should study it well. This is my point of view.

不仅如此，市场被瓜分，而且还在被继续蚕食。由于中外汽车产业在技术、资金、管理等方面的明显差距，中国自主品牌汽车的品牌市场溢价能力与品牌价值与合资品牌相比还存在一定差距，造成自主品牌轿车的市场占有率较低，仅在30％左右徘徊。合资品牌轿车占据了70％的市场份额。现在，他们又将眼睛盯向这30％左右的市场，正在有计划有组织，逐步地开始蚕食自主品牌占绝对优势的中低端市场。

《21世纪》：中国汽车产业的现状说明，自主创新，掌握具有自主知识产权的核心技术，培育中国自主品牌已经刻不容缓？

徐秉金：是的。这个问题极为重要。这个问题不解决，中国汽车产业就难以成为战略支柱产业。中国汽车工业的组织者和领导者，原全国人大副委员长和国务院副总理邹家华同志最近给我们题词：“自主创新车魂”。就是从精神层面强调自主创新的重要性。什么是魂？魂就是精神，就是不畏困难，昂扬向上的思想面貌。那种萎靡不振，充满惰性就是没有精神，就是“丢了魂”。人有魂，车也有魂。车是人造的，人的精神物化在车中，车也就有了“魂魄”。

邹家华同志的题词，是对我们中国汽车人的耳提面命，是激励我们树立自强不息的民族精神，端正自主创新的心态和认识。通过刻苦努力，掌握具有自主知识产权的核心技术，培育出过硬的民族品牌。

自主创新强调的是思想和精神上独立自主创新。这种独立自主绝不是盲目排外，而是在虚心向一切先进者学习的同时，强调以我为主发展自己。

今天中国与发达国家在知识、技术和经验方面还有着较大的差距，仍然需要向外学习。如果我们一方面打开国门，改革开放，一方面却在思想和精神上偏离了自主的意识，盲目崇洋媚外，这就背离了改革开放的初衷。必须认识到，今天中国经济与社会的发展，是中国付出了巨大的经济和物质代价才换来的！国外的技术、知识和资本决不是到中国来做无偿奉献的。如果只看到1800万辆汽车，只看到那些漂亮的轿车充斥街头，而没有看到我们的市场被瓜分蚕食，我们的企业出现严重的技术空心化，没看到我们付出的经济和环境资源的沉重代价，那才是被人卖了还帮人数钱的傻瓜。才是“丢了魂”！

《21世纪》：2009年9月12日，美国总统奥巴马宣布对中国进口的所有小轿车和轻型卡车轮胎实施为期三年的惩罚性关税。奥巴马总统辩称他是在按照协议办事，他所恪守的“贸易条款”究竟是什么？这个条款是怎么产生的？

徐秉金：他说的贸易条款指的是中国加入WTO协议书中的第16条“特定产品过渡性保障机制”，简称“特保条款”。从中国加入WTO起执行，为期12年。

1986年中国启动复关谈判时，美国和欧盟对中国经贸体制极为不信任，担心中国政府利用财政补贴人为压低产品价格向外倾销，为此提出一项“保障性措施”。1992年2月13日关贸总协定审议中国外贸制度问题会议上，在谈判结束前一个小时，转入议定书初步框架阶段，美国和欧盟提出，由于中国市场经济制度不完善，中国产品低价倾销会对别国市场造成损害，因此需要在中国的复关议定书附件中专门针对中国设立特别条款：审查程序、特别保障条款、互不适用条款。从谈判形势上看，美国和欧盟将“特别保障条款”作为中国复关的必然代价，若中国不同意这一条，便不通过中国入关。该条款如同一根鱼刺卡在复关的咽喉要道。经过反复商量，权衡利害，1992年3月3日，外经贸部和外交部合署给国务院提交一份关于过渡性“特别保障条款”的说明。虽然有了这一个说明，中方也一直坚守阵地，并未抛出。以后的谈判中，美国和欧盟对此死不松口，坚持认为中国经济体制不能达到关贸总协定的标准。由于中国复关入世谈判旷日持久，国内政治与经济发展形势需要中方尽快达成协议。到了中国入世阶段，特保条款一直成为议定书一项必不可少的条款。1995年中美重新恢复谈判时，美国给出的中国入世路线图明确提出“借鉴其他混合经济国家加入协定书的先例，中国协定书也需要包括特保条款和进口承诺条款”。之后经历波折，1999年中美达成的双边协议、2000年中欧达成的双边协议，特保条款都存在双方协议中。随着中国入世谈判达到终点，“特保条款”已经被印到中国入世的门票上了。

《21世纪》：您多次讲到，如何看待中国入世10年的成绩和教训，需要冷静的分析的，您这句话的含义是什么？

徐秉金：当年中国政府决定复关时就定下原则有三条：第一，中国要求恢复关贸总协定缔约国地位而不是重新加入；第二，中国愿意就恢复条件与缔约国进行实质性谈判；第三，中国是发展中国家，应当享受发展中国家的待遇。同时还提出了三项要求：第一，按照关贸总协定的原则，美国应该给予中国多边无条件的最惠国待遇；第二，中国应在发达缔约国家中享受普惠制待遇；第三，欧共体应该取消对中国的歧视性限制。

这三项原则与三项要求综合而言就是权力与义务的平衡。但在中国入世最后谈判时，美国、欧盟提出，由于中国的市场经济制度不完善，需要在中国的复关议定书中附加专门针对中国的特别条款：审查程序、特别保障条款、互不适用条款。欧共体甚至建议，对中国采用35％的约束性关税。中国三条要求中的后两条至今未能实现。到今天，中国也不能享受完全缔约方的待遇，仍然受到歧视性条款限制，只能算是世贸组织的二等公民。

《21世纪》：二等公民？这个提法是第一次听到。

徐秉金：对！今天中国在世贸组织中，该承担的义务都承担了，但该享受的权利却仍然没有完全享受。美国、欧盟、日本等国家坚决不承认中国的“市场经济地位”，由此造成中国产品出口被美国、欧盟反复以所谓“倾销”罪名予以制裁。实际上，中国早在1992年就正式宣布实行社会主义市场经济，根据国际公认的准则，100％为市场经济标准，60％是达到市场经济标准的临界水平，超过60％就可以认为达到了市场经济标准的最低线，可视为市场经济国家。根据这一指标，2001年底我国市场化程度已达到69％，意味着市场经济体制已经建立，迄今为止，全世界已经有80多个国家正式承认中国的市场经济地位。但美国欧盟就是不松口，今天他们遭受危机，向中国借钱，中国提出“市场经济地位”问题，他们都不答应。

《21世纪》：有关部门向中央提出向一些国家“索要”市场经济地位实在不是一个好的建议。

徐秉金：“市场经济地位”不是要不要的问题，而是承认不承认现实的问题。美国、欧盟出于对我们的政治敌视和经济利益，当然不愿意让中国得到自己应该得到的东西。中国入世议定书签署后，我立刻以个人名义给国务院写出报告《我对议定书法律条款的意见》，我在报告中提出：中国入世谈判中在市场准入方面作出的让步不只是换取成员的名谓，而是为了我国取得平等成员的资格进入WTO市场，这个平等是靠WTO多边最惠国待遇实现的。但是由于中国在加入议定书中接受了12年的“选择性保障条款”和15年的“计划经济”的定位，平等的WTO成员地位大打折扣。任何成员都有权引用该条款限制中国的进口。如出现这种情况，加入WTO成为其成员的意义已无实质内容。

《21世纪》：您如何评价这10年？

徐秉金：现在有些人宣传中国入世的成绩，话说过头了，都快超越了改革开放的历史功绩，这是不合适的。入世是中国改革开放的成果，入世使得中国的经济与世界经济有了对接的渠道。但入世后，也使中国经济受到了一定程度的影响。客观地看，中国经济发展，并不全是加入WTO10年的成绩而是改革开放的成绩，加入WTO也是改革开放的成绩之一，对此绝不能本末倒置。相反，恰恰这10年正是我们遇到贸易摩擦最多的时候，是外国资本进入中国攻城略地最严重的时候。你可以放眼看看，汽车、日用家电、日化产品、碳酸饮料等20多种产业全部占领了中国国内市场。今天你们还有几个人记得“北冰洋”汽水？还有几个人记得“蜂花”洗发水？还有几个人记得“活力28，沙市日化”？喝饮料就是“可乐”，吃东西就是“肯特鸡”，购物就是“沃尔玛”、“家乐福”，买日化用品就是“联合利华”，在这些洋品牌的大举进攻下，我们的民族品牌还剩几个？中国经济发展要的是建立在自己民族基础上的实业。那些合资企业、独资企业所赚得的利润都是拿回本国去，我们所得到的不过是点可怜的1％-5％的“代工费”，那些资本家已经赚得脑满肠肥。就是这样，他们还不满足，美国、欧盟为了转嫁国内经济危机，纷纷将贸易制裁的大棒对准了我们。对此，我们应该深刻反思。我们加入世贸组织的目的是什么？加入后我们遇到了哪些问题？美国、欧盟等国家和组织是如何利用世贸组织的规则来做损人利己的事情？我们应该如何利用这些相关规则来保护自己，解决贸易纷争，主动维护中国企业的权益？这才是我们应该做的。

《21世纪》：您是汽车行业的专家，人们在谈到汽车行业入世后都是在“唱赞歌”，认为入世后，中国汽车产业不仅没有遭到灭顶之灾，相反，中国已经是世界最大的汽车生产与销售国，我希望听到您的意见或者评论。

徐秉金：首先必须看到，入世后，中国汽车产业的确没有遭到一些人所说的“灭顶之灾”，而是取得了长足的进展。该如何分析这个现象呢？我个人的认识是，首先这就得益于当年入世谈判时中方对美国、欧盟、日本为首的发达国家在汽车进口上设置的门槛。第二，正是因为国内改革开放几十年，经济稳定增长，人民群众的生活水平提高，购买力持续提高，导致国内市场积蓄的购买力能量空前爆发，是中国市场消费支撑了汽车产业。要知道，中国是个高储蓄国家，老百姓尤其是城市的群众生活特别是大城市的群众收入水平提高很快，百姓有了钱就要花。新世纪之初，我们的汽车消费还是以政府公务用车和出租行业为主，这个市场不算大。但当时“先富起来的”那些人少说也有几百万，也正是在这个时候，国家政策导向开始放宽限制，鼓励私人购车，这就使消费者手里积蓄的购买力有了释放的地方。想一想，一下子出现几百万甚至更多的消费，对于那时轿车产量不过百万辆的中国汽车产业来说意味着什么？所以，形象地说，是中国消费者给了中国汽车产业发展的“市场”，是消费者这个“民间银行”给了中国汽车产业巨额的发展资金。有了市场，又有了资金，中国汽车产业还能有“灭顶之灾”吗？有意思的是，这个现象很多人当时都没有看清楚，这是消费者的力量，是市场的力量，说到底，是改革开放的成果。

但一个产业的发展光有钱和市场还不够，还要有技术，对中国汽车产业来说，技术是最为缺乏的，这和我们国家的发展历史有关。正是因为缺乏技术，所以中央才在1986年北戴河会议上决定合资发展中国的轿车产业。几十年来，中国的一汽、二汽、上汽、广州、天津、北京等主要汽车企业都走上了合资生产轿车的道路。到今天为止，美国、欧洲、日本、韩国等世界上排名前10位的世界汽车跨国集团在中国境内都建立了自己的合资企业。他们为什么愿意到中国来投资呢？无利不起早，他们来到中国，正是看中了中国巨大的市场潜力。要知道，上世纪80年代初期，中国要找外国汽车集团合资，原中汽总公司董事长饶斌带领队在世界各大汽车集团跑了两年，也没有人愿意和我们合作。 why?人家瞧不起咱们，人家没有看到中国的市场潜力，不愿意来。最后还是德国大众集团的董事长哈恩独具慧眼，率先与中国上海合资，才有了上海桑塔纳，但那时的规模也可怜，一年不过3万辆。以后因为世界经济危机，法国、美国为摆脱经济危机，开始向海外投资，看到中国改革开放成绩斐然，经济持续高速增长，才在德国后面相继行动。但当时的规模也不大，一汽的规模为3万辆奥迪和捷达15万辆，目的是“进口替代”；二汽与法国雪铁龙合资，设计规模为30万辆，目的是“出口导向”，规划产量的2／3出口；上海桑塔纳的生产规模为3万辆。算一算，加在一起也不过50万辆左右，规模很小。日本、韩国是看到德国、法国赚大钱了才跟着挤进中国，他们是最后才进来的。这些跨国公司与中国合资，带来了现代轿车的生产技术，也充分享受了中国汽车市场的高额回报，一个个赚得盆满钵满。

遗憾的是，我们轿车合资几十年，但并未达到当初合资的目的。当时合资的目的是，引进外国先进技术和资金，发展中国的轿车产业，同时开展零部件国产化，争取在七八年的时间内，实现完全国产化。由于多方面的原因，我们的国产化进展缓慢，至今未能掌握轿车关键零部件的核心技术；我们的出口导向彻底失败，二汽出口2／3成为一句空话；相反，我们的汽车市场却被这些跨国公司瓜分蚕食，70％的市场被他们控制。

汽车产业是国家的战略支柱产业，从某种意义上讲，我们的战略支柱产业建立在外资集团的基础上，这直接影响了中国国家的经济安全。想一想，中国的汽车方向盘却掌握在外资手里，这靠谱吗？

《21世纪》：您怎么看中国汽车产销超过美国号称世界第一的呢？

徐秉金：目前中国汽车产销1800万辆，其中乘用车1300万辆，商用车500万辆，超过美国号称世界第一，很多人对此也沾沾自喜。但从几个基本数据看，我们无法乐观：首先，我们并没有1800万辆，1800万辆是我们自己的统计，而德国大众、美国通用、日本丰田、本田、法国雪铁龙、韩国现代等世界跨国巨头并不这样看。在他们的统计数据里，中国合资企业的产品都被计入他们的产量之中。他们这样做也没错，因为这些合资企业每年给他们提供的利润占其全球收入的主要部分或是说绝大部分。这些产品都是由其母公司拿来在中国合资企业装配生产的，产品的头上都顶着其公司的标牌。

我给你一组数据：截至2010年12月31日，通用汽车全年在中国销售累计达到2351610辆；大众汽车集团全年在中国销售汽车1923500辆；现代起亚汽车全年在中国市场销售1093071辆；日产汽车在中国销售累计达1023638辆。除了这四家外，丰田84.6万辆；本田65.5万辆；福特58.2万辆；标致-雪铁龙37.6万辆；铃木27.5；宝马17万辆。这10家公司销量之和为929.6万辆，占中国汽车市场一半以上，占轿车市场70％。到今天为止，世界500强企业中，15家汽车企业全部在中国建有合资企业和机构。这15家汽车企业跨国公司在中国的平均资产利润率达到11.2％，远远高于他们在世界其他市场的平均利润率。

在这些跨国公司眼里，中国只是世界第一大汽车市场，中国的合资企业只是他们设在海外的装配厂。如果除掉这些跨国公司在中国合资企业装配的产品，我们还剩多少呢？就只剩下我们这些自主品牌企业生产的产品了。跨国公司所公布的在华销售业绩，从一个侧面真实地反映了中国汽车产业和市场的实际。所以，面对1800万辆的统计，我们要冷静，切不可沾沾自喜。另外他们的进口汽车仍旧以高于他们本国市场一倍甚至更多的价格销售到中国市场，他们在中国市场赚得的利润远远高于他们国内市场，中国消费者并未能如有些人所宣传的“购买到了经济实惠的进口产品”。

《21世纪》：自主创新是中央基于新时期中国经济建设和社会发展的迫切需要而提出来的，从汽车产业的现状来看，自主创新显得更为迫切吗？

徐秉金：当然。汽车是技术密集型产品，一辆汽车上几乎集成了现代大多数科技精华，尤其是电子技术。但我们掌握了多少具有自主知识产权的核心技术呢？车身、变速箱、发动机、汽车电子、整车设计等关键技术，我们真正掌握了的又有多少呢？所有人都心知肚明，这次3·11日本大地震，给中国汽车产业带来的影响就充分说明了这个问题。我们基本没有掌握核心技术，也缺少技术储备，这是中国汽车产业自主创新亟需突破的门槛。

《21世纪》：我记得，《中美市场准入谅解备忘录》签署之后，国内媒体普遍表现出过度乐观的情绪，后来事实证明，中国入关仍然困难重重，您能告诉我们问题出在哪里？

徐秉金：美方一直把经济问题政治化，把中国复关问题作为一道政治筹码来压中国让步，这是他们的政治意愿。但国内有些人并没有看清美国的政治意愿，而是有点急于求成，甚至一厢情愿。协议签署后，不少人的乐观情绪上升，有的人甚至开始预测中国复关的时间表。我认为在媒体的宣传上，相关主管部门提供的信息是急于求成，甚至觉得1992年之前就一定能完成复关。美国人一听到这个消息，筹码就要得很厉害了，提出了很多苛刻的无法接受的条件。从这些条件上看，中国的复关之路将充满坎坷。为此，我在1992年12月1日和12月21日分别给国务院写了“关于第九轮中美市场准入谈判情况”和“恢复关贸总协定缔约国地位对我国经济及工业的影响和对策”的报告，报告对纷繁复杂的谈判局面，做出了冷静客观的判断。

《21世纪》：1994年7月《香港商报》头版头条刊登采访您的“中国复关谈判遭美延迟，徐秉金说等待是有限度的”。您当时为什么这么认为？

徐秉金：1994年3月18日，我和美国代表道斯金谈判，话题是非关税减让措施，我发现，道斯金提出的很多问题都是中国已经回答，甚至是多次回答的问题，她却总是不厌其烦地提出，当时我感觉她是在拖延时间。于是我问她：“我无法理解你反复提出同一个问题的动机，像这样无休止地谈下去，何时是个头？中美双方需要配合加快进度，比如最近中国和欧盟谈判就有进展了。”

我这句话是想摸清楚美国政府的底牌，看看美国的拖延战术是否有时间表。道斯金立刻回答：“美国反对为谈判的最后期限做任何没有把握的猜测，美国不赞成为中国加入关贸总协定规定一个人为的最后期限。”

道斯金的话实质上是一个政治表态，即美国认为现在还不到让中国复关的时候，这就是美国政府的政治意愿。

中国是联合国常任理事国，连世贸组织参加不进去，能说明什么问题啊？但是这个世贸组织是美国人控制的，美国人的心态复杂，它希望你进去，放开市场对它有好处，它又害怕你参与进去，跟它抗衡，它又受不了，所以和中国谈判的时间这么长，它是要你的筹码，让你交学费的。我当时认为，政治的问题不解决，你做什么让步都没有用，这是两国政治上的较量，他肯定要拿到足够的筹码，认为自己的利益得到保障后，才会同意你进来。但我们不可能无限制地等下去，也不可能满足他们的无理要求。所以我才说这番话，其目的是告诉美国，不要指望中国会为了复关而无原则退让。

《21世纪》：1995年11月8日，美国副贸易代表巴尔舍夫斯基向中方提交一份“中国加入世界贸易组织非正式文件”，即所谓中国加入WTO的“路线图”，当时机电办如何向中央解剖这个“路线图”？这一路线图反映了美国谈判策略有哪些转变？

徐秉金：这份非正式文件，涉及市场准入、服务贸易和协定书等诸多问题，是美方首次就中国入世提出的一揽子要价。把中国挡在世贸组织门外，美国在中国甚至世界的政治经济利益都受到严重损害，这不符合美国的根本利益，让中国进入世贸组织，但是必须要提高要价。这就是美方抛出“路线图”的基本想法。总的来看，这份路线图是美国的问路之石，也是美方讨价还价的基础，与以前的漫天要价和粗暴横蛮态度相比，这次美方在要价上强调利用过渡期来解决谈判中的焦点，表现出了一定的灵活性，同时谈判态度也开始转向灵活务实。但是利用中国的入世要求，提出高要价，压迫中国改变经济制度，遏制中国经济发展，防止中国成为与美国竞争的强国是其根本目的。

拿到这份“路线图”之后，我们机电办的同志进行认真的研究。与美国代表交锋多年，我们也摸透了他们的心理。美国希望中国入世，但绝对不会白给。我们认为美国提出的“路线图”，是美国对中国加入WTO的全面要价，要价之高完全超出我国现阶段经济发展水平和承受能力，是我国完全不能接受的。双方谈了这么多年没能达成协议，美方也曾做出了“坚定支持中国复关的”承诺，但从未兑现，现在他们在“路线图”中又保证要采取“灵活务实”的态度，其目的在于既要将中国留在谈判桌上，又要提高谈判价码。如果中国不能满足其要求，就拖延、阻挠中国入世进程。从“路线图”可以看出，美国那时还没有让中国尽快入世的政治意愿。

《21世纪》：您和龙永图去韩国和日本谈判，据说你们只用了一天就达成中韩双边协议。能谈谈为什么有如此高的效率？

徐秉金：韩国是中国的近邻，在非

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